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1. Introduction 
 
The surprising outcome of the United Kingdom (UK)’s European Union (EU) referendum, 
the so-called “Brexit”, leads to several doubts about the future relationship between the UK and 
the EU. The most noticeable, direct economic effect registered before and in the aftermath of the 
Brexit referendum is the sharp devaluation of the sterling pound (GBP). However, the Brexit win 
is also associated with major political uncertainties on the implementation of the UK departure 
from the EU. This unexpected outcome thus represents an interesting opportunity to analyze the 
consequences of an unusual decision to renounce a free trade agreement, one of EU’s founding 
principles.  
I exploit this exceptional instable environment to address the effects of the Brexit referendum 
on the bilateral trade between Belgium and its main trading partners – United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, and the Netherlands. Belgium is undoubtedly among the most affected European countries 
by this decision4, and represents an interesting setting to study the impact of the Brexit referendum 
on international trade. I focus my analysis on whether the uncertainties governing the future Brexit 
arrangements could be affecting Belgian and British trading firms’ decisions in the short-run, i.e., 
prior to the actual Brexit. Then, I investigate the impact of uncertainty on trade over and above the 
effect of the currency depreciation on bilateral trade. Specifically, I hypothesize that Belgian and 
British trading firms could be reacting in advance to the potential introduction of tariffs and non-
tariffs barriers in the wake of the Brexit agreements completion.  
To empirically test my hypothesis, I examine both Belgian firms’ import and export trade 
flows to the UK and to other Belgium’s main trading partners from January 2012 to June 2017. I 
focus on the intensive margin of trade by Belgian firms, since most of the Belgian trade flows are 
driven by incumbent companies. I do not use firm-product level information because the 
aggregation by firms already enables me to identify the effects of the uncertainties related to the 
Brexit referendum on the Belgian international trade.  
My identification strategy relies on Belgian firms with trade relationships with at least two 
Belgium neighboring countries at a given time. These firms with multiple country connections are 
not only more prone to quickly divert their trade flows to other markets (since they do not incur in 
 
4 Belgium and the UK have deep financial and trade ties, and the still unknown consequences of the Brexit will change 
and reshape this relationship. For instance, The UK is the Belgian’s 4th trade partner and the 1st considering non-Euro 
partners.  
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sunk costs to create new relationships), they also allow for a within-firm comparison. Doing so, I 
can abstract from firm-specific characteristics, such as productivity and management, that may be 
driven by aggregate uncertainty, and focus exclusively on the impact of uncertainty on trade 
decisions. 
I start by searching for possible trends in Belgian firms’ imports and exports to each of 
Belgium’s main trading partners in comparison with the UK. I look at the relative changes in the 
trade between Belgium and the UK in each of the semesters in the aftermath of the surprising 
referendum outcome, as well as variations in the semesters preceding the voting procedure. These 
preliminary specifications allow me to identify similar movements of Belgian firms’ trade flows 
from/to Germany, France, and the Netherlands.  
Based on the outcomes of these introductory investigation, I develop a difference-in-
differences strategy to disentangle the effects of political uncertainty and economic fundamentals. 
The treatment group are the flows to and from the UK, whereas the control group are the flows to 
and from France, Germany and the Netherlands. I use three time periods to account for possible 
effects of Brexit uncertainties. The pre-period starts in 2012 and runs until David Cameron’s 
announcement that there will be a referendum. The “intermediate period”, is a dummy which takes 
the value of one during the period in between the announcement of the referendum but before the 
results’ announcement (from July 2015 to June 2016). The “post-referendum period” relates to the 
period in the aftermath of referendum outcome (from July 2016 to June 2017). In my main 
specification, I use firm-time fixed-effects to capture firms’ unobserved characteristics and 
introduce macroeconomic variables (exchange rates, GDP growth, inflation rates, and interest 
rates) to isolate the effect of uncertainties from macro-economic conditions.  
Concerning export flows’ growth rates, the outcomes without macroeconomic controls show 
that Belgian firms reduce their outward trade to the UK market in 7.2 percentage points in the year 
before the referendum, and in 9.3 afterward, relative to the pre-period and in comparison with the 
evolution to Belgium’s other main trading partners. These results comprise Belgian firms’ capacity 
to prevent a high pass-through of exchange rate changes to export prices, preservation of their 
markups, and adeptness to differentiate prices across markets. The introduction of economic 
fundamentals influences the magnitude of these coefficients but does not eliminate their relevance 
and statistical significance. Hence, I find that, after controlling for macroeconomic variables (in 
particular the exchange rate), Belgian firms’ export flows’ growth rates to the UK are 5.8 and 4.4 
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percentage points lower one year before and one year after the Brexit referendum, respectively, in 
comparison to Belgium’s other neighboring countries.  
Consequently, the instable environment created by the Brexit referendum boosts the negative 
price effects of the GBP devaluation on Belgian export flows’ growth rates. Particularly, this effect 
might be explained by the impact of Brexit uncertainties on both trading partners. From one side, 
Belgian exporting firms possibly postpone their exports to the UK to a more stable and predictable 
period or divert part of their production to other trading partners, while British firms and 
households may adopt a more precautionary behavior in the wake of the doubts motivated by the 
referendum and its unexpected outcome. 
Regarding inward trade flow, I find in the specifications without macro-economic controls 
that the average growth rate of Belgian trading firms’ import flows from the UK does not present 
any statistically difference from Belgium’s other main neighboring countries immediately before 
the Brexit referendum, but are 4.3 percentage points relatively lower in the subsequent year. 
However, after controlling for economic fundamentals, this last result disappears, implying that 
macroeconomic controls capture all the variation and that Brexit uncertainties do not have an 
impact on Belgian import flows. These results suggest that import and export markets have specific 
dynamics and react differently to changes in economic variables and political uncertainties, which 
might be explained by the rigidity of import flows, both in prices and in quantities, and more 
sensitivity of export flows to economic and political turmoil.  
Further, I provide additional discussion concerning the impact of the Brexit referendum on 
the bilateral trade between Belgium and its main trading partners. I examine the heterogeneity of 
these effects by distinguishing Belgian firms’ by size (large and small firms) and sector 
(commodities and manufacturing firms). In regard to export flows, my results imply that larger 
firms, more able to absorb the associated costs, either postpone exports to the UK or divert them 
to other markets in the period preceding the Brexit referendum. The results for manufacturing 
firms, which are more responsive to changes in competitiveness, also suggest more reaction to the 
Brexit uncertainties, but are not statistically different from those of the commodities’ sector. When 
it comes to import flows, I find variations between subsamples towards relatively more imports 
from the UK in smaller and manufacturing firms’ subsamples. However, these results cannot be 
associates to the political uncertainties caused by the Brexit referendum. 
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This paper is related to two different streams of literature. First, this research concerns the 
impact of political uncertainty on economic activity. The literature on this subject addresses these 
effects on firms’ investment (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2015), employment (Baker et 
al., 2016), output and productivity (Bloom, 2009). Specifically regarding the impact of Brexit 
referendum, Campello et al. (2018) use this novel event to measure the spillover of political 
uncertainties on American corporations’ decisions regarding investment, employment, R&D, and 
savings. I take a different avenue and follow an incipient literature on the effects of political 
distress on trade activity (Pierce and Schott, 2016; Handley and Limão, 2017; Steinberg, 2019). 
Second, this study is close to the literature on the impact of exchange rate shocks on importing and 
exporting firms, which is usually concerned with firms’ markup, pricing-to-market and exchange 
rate pass-through in the wake of an unexpected event (Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008; Neiman, 
2010; Amiti et al., 2014; Li at al., 2015).  
Regarding the specific impact of the unstable environment created by the Brexit referendum 
on trade activity, my paper is closely related to Winters and Fernandes (2018), who use the 
referendum as a quasi-natural experiment to analyze the effect of GBP devaluation on Portuguese 
exports. My analysis differs from their paper in at least three important ways: first, I go beyond 
the estimation of the consequences of an exchange rate shock per se by seeking to isolate the effect 
of political uncertainties on firms’ short run decisions from pure economic circumstances; second, 
I take into account the period preceding the Brexit referendum, in which uncertainties related to 
the Brexit future agreements are already driving both exchange rates movements and trading firms’ 
decisions; and, third, I use both firms’ exports and imports information, which allow me to 
differentiate the impact of an exchange rate shock and political uncertainty in both segments.  
Although I focus on a specific country and on the short-run consequences of an uncertainty-
trigger event, my findings may be useful to other economies with significant financial and trade 
relationship with the UK, especially those which are part of the EU. This research is also important 
to understand the collateral effects of the decision-making to renounce a free trade agreement and 
how the underlying uncertainties affect exchange rate markets and firms’ short-run decisions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide a review of the 
literature concerning the effects of political uncertainty on firms’ decision and, specifically, on 
trade. Section 3 presents a brief overview of the effects of Brexit uncertainties on the GBP 
exchange market. Section 4 discusses the potential impact of the GBP devaluation on Belgian 
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firms’ import and export flows and delineates the testable hypothesis of this study. Section 5 
describes data sources, variables’ construction, and presents descriptive statistics and a preview of 
the data. Section 6 presents the methodology and empirical results, including the additional 
discussion concerning the heterogeneity of Belgian exporting firms by firm size and sector. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review: the effects of political uncertainty on trade 
 
The theory concerning the effects of political uncertainties on economy has been addressed in 
the literature by several lens, such as the impact on firms’ investment decisions, households’ 
consumption, and asset prices (IMF, 2016). In regard specifically to firms, assuming the 
irreversibility of investment decisions, firms’ managers facing events of political distress may 
postpone new projects to periods of more stable and predictable economic environment (Bernanke, 
1983; Dixit, 1989; Bloom et al., 2007). Empirically, there is evidence that this slowdown in 
investment caused by political uncertainties spreads over to the economy, resulting not only in less 
investments (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2015), but also in reduced employment (Leduc 
and Liu, 2015; Baker et al. 2016) and lower productivity and output ((Bloom, 2009). 
Regarding the impact of political uncertainty on trade, the most noticeable way that this effects 
can be experienced is through the higher volatility in the exchange rate market. However, although 
in theory exchange rate volatility could harm trade flows because of higher costs of hedge (Clark, 
1973; Hooper and Kohlhagen, 1978), the empirical findings are conflicting, with negative (Arize 
et al., 2000; Sauer and Bohara, 2001), indeterminate (Gagnon, 1993; Baum et al., 2006) and 
positive (Baum and Caglayan, 2010) outcomes.  
Likewise the overall impact on economy, political turmoil affects trade by the delay of firms’ 
decision to enter foreign markets, by the decision to postpone new investments, in case of 
incumbent trading firms, and by motivating a more cautious behavior in households’ consumption, 
affecting the demand for tradable products. In this regard, there is an increasing theoretical 
literature on trade political uncertainty. For instance, Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) develop a 
dynamic structural model that links exporter firms’ decisions to enter or to increase volumes 
depending on future market conditions, such as exchange rate and policy changes. Arkolakis 
(2010) relates foreign market penetration to marketing costs, which leads to increasing costs to 
reach a broader set of costumers. Handley and Limão (2017) models the effects of changes in trade 
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policy on firms and consumers, adding that political uncertainty influences not only the entrance 
of new firms in the export market, usually with small volumes, but also incumbent exporting firms’ 
investments in technology upgrading, affecting the more representative intensive margin of 
exports. Finally, Steinberg (2019) constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model to measure the 
effect of uncertainty related to the Brexit agreement on the UK economy. His model takes into 
account two scenarios – soft and hard Brexit -, which predicts limited impact of uncertainty 
triggered by the Brexit results on the UK economy.  
 
3. The Brexit Referendum and the GBP/Euro devaluation 
 
To have a more comprehensive understanding of the uncertainties surrounding the Brexit 
referendum, I provide a brief analysis of the GBP/euro exchange rates’ progress from January 
2013 to June 2017, illustrated in Figure 1. The GBP/euro exchange rates present two 
approximately symmetric movements throughout this period: a GBP appreciation, from January 
2013 to its peak in November 2015; and a GBP devaluation, from November 15 on. Understanding 
the motivations for these upward and downward movements is essential to figure out which part 
might be related to actual economic fundamentals5 and which part is derived from expectations 
regarding the Brexit referendum.  
While the stronger British domestic demand in comparison with EU countries reasonably 
explains the appreciation of the GBP/euro between 2013 and 2015, UK economic performance 
does not seem to be responsible for the following weakening of the GBP. To support this argument, 
I present in Figure 2 the differences in economic growth between the UK and Belgium’s other 
main trade partners (Germany, France, and the Netherlands). The UK economy grows at a rate 
considerably higher than its neighboring countries’ economies until the end of 2015 but does not 
underperform significantly in comparison to its EU peers as from 2016. 
Another plausible explanation for the GBP devaluation could come from monetary policy 
issues, such as differences in inflation and interest rates between both sides in the short-run. 
Figures 3A and 3B compare the inflation and benchmark interest rates in the UK and in the EU, 
 
5 There is an extensive literature on the unpredictability of exchange rates by macroeconomic fundamentals, starting 
with Meese and Rogoff (1983a, 1983b). Several papers have addressed this puzzle since them, with limited success 
(MacDonald and Taylor, 1994; Chinn and Meese, 1995; Mark and Sul, 2001; Kilian and Taylor, 2003). Even though 
exchange rates may follow a random walk in the short run (Engels and West, 2005), I use macroeconomic 
fundamentals to mark out my reasoning and rule out these explanations for the GBP devaluation starting at the end of 
2015.   
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respectively. Concerning inflation rates, there are also no substantial differences between both 
economies’ indices that could justify exchange rate corrections.  
When it comes to interest rates, the reduction in European Central Bank (ECB)’s benchmark 
interest rates from 2013 to 2015 could have had an impact on GBP appreciation, due to less 
attractive Euro Zone’s fixed-income bonds. However, as from 2016, besides a slightly drop in 
ECB’s rate, the Bank of England reduces the British benchmark interest rate with 250 basis points 
as an attempt to overcome the potential adverse economic effects of the surprising Brexit 
referendum outcome on UK’s economic prospects. However, although this decision could lead to 
less short-run investment flows in the UK, its magnitude does not seem sufficient to reasonably 
explain the concurrent GBP devaluation. 
Setting aside the relevance of short-run economic fundamentals to explain the GBP 
devaluation that started at the end of 2015, this movement could still be explained, from a long 
term perspective, by a natural mean reversion of the GPB/euro exchange rate (Kilian and Taylor, 
2003). However, the most plausible explanation seems to come from market expectations. Taking 
into consideration the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index for the UK6 (Baker et al., 2016), 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the EPU index in combination with the euro/GBP spot rate and its 
respective volatility index7.  
In the time preceding the Brexit referendum, it can be noted that, as of the approval of the 
referendum, the GBP starts to depreciate in accordance with the rise in uncertainties, captured both 
by the EPU and by the exchange volatility indices. In the aftermath of the announcement of 
referendum results, the GBP experiences a new round of depreciation to adjust for the unexpected 
outcome, while the EPU increases as a natural consequence of the debate about the consequences 
of the UK departure from the EU. Oppositely, the GBP/euro volatility drops, as long as the event 
triggering the financial market stability realizes and its underlying cause is still distant to 
materialize.    
Specifically, Broadbent (2017) provides an insightful reasoning for the GBP devaluation, 
which, in his consideration, is a result of two expected effects of the Brexit on the real equilibrium 
 
6 Available on www.policyuncertainty.com. The methodology takes into consideration the number of new articles that 
include the terms “uncertainty” and other policy terms (“economy”, “policy”, “regulation”, etc) in 11 UK relevant 
newspapers.  
7 BPVIX, retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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exchange rate (REER)8: first, the possibility of the introduction of new tariffs and non-tariffs 
barriers, changing the relative prices of tradable goods (external component); and, second, the 
relatively higher costs of UK-produced tradable goods after the Brexit completion, affecting the 
productivity of non-tradable goods in the UK (internal component). As a result, exchange rate 
market agents anticipate and price the potential deterioration of trade relationship between the UK 
and the EU. 
 
4. Testable hypotheses 
 
In order to derive testable hypotheses concerning the impact of Brexit uncertainties on Belgian 
firms’ trade flows, I start with the main assumption of this paper. Belgian firms exposed to the UK 
market and British trading firms may have reacted not only to the exchange rate market behavior 
(GBP devaluation and increasing volatility) triggered by the Brexit referendum, but also to the 
potential introduction of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers in the wake of the Brexit agreements 
completion. Then, Belgian and British trading firms may have postponed investments and trade 
decisions to a period of more predictability of the future impact of the Brexit agreement, for 
instance. Belgian firms, in especial, could have also could have also been affected by a more 
cautious British households’ consumption behavior and temporarily diverted part of 
exports/imports to other markets, especially those in which they have already a relationship and 
do not incur in sunk costs. 
To illustrate the possible effects of the Brexit referendum on Belgian firms’ import and export 
flows, I rely initially on the extensive literature concerning the impact of exchange rate shocks on 
trade. Following, I differentiate the potential impact of uncertainties from the effects of exchange 
rates changes. 
4.1 Exchange rate shocks 
At first, it is important to discuss the currency pricing in which the trade between the EU and 
the UK is carried out. The literature on local currency pricing (LCP) has made important 
 
8 The REER is measured by the nominal exchange rate (e) deflated by the ratio between foreign (𝑃∗) and overall 
domestic (P) price indexes and can be decomposed into an external component (𝑞𝑇), which takes into account the 
domestic (𝑃𝑇) and foreign (𝑃𝑇
∗) prices of tradable goods; and an internal component (𝑞𝑁𝑇), denoted by the relationship 
between tradable and non-tradable goods.  
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contributions to the incompleteness of the exchange rate pass-through (ERPT). For instance, 
Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) study price stickiness and find local currency pricing in US imports 
and producer currency pricing in US exports. In the wake of this study, Gopinath et al. (2010) 
show that local currency pricing in US dollars contributes to import price rigidity and a lower 
ERPT into US import prices. Using Swiss data, Bonadio et al. (2018) find no price adjustments 
for goods invoiced in euros following the Swiss franc appreciation in 2015. 
Concerning the limited literature on the use of euro in international trade flows, Amiti et al. 
(2018) shed some lights on the currency invoicing of European firms with Belgian data. Using 
extra-EU transactions, they document that approximately 40% of Belgian exports and imports to 
destinations outside EU are denominated in euros, and find that this pattern is more pronounced in 
smaller and non-import-intensive firms. Oppositely, larger firms and especially those who import 
goods from the US invoiced in dollars are more prone to negotiate exports in this same currency. 
Within the EU, it is reasonable to expect that most of transactions of tradable goods are 
invoiced in euros. Particularly in relation to the EU trade with the UK, I also expected that euro 
plays the role of a regional dominant currency, given the considerably larger economy of the set 
of euro denominated countries in comparison to the UK. Consequently, I assume hereafter local 
currency pricing in EU imports and producer currency pricing in EU exports.  
4.1.1 Import flows  
Starting with import flows, Table 1A demonstrates a simple example of the possible dynamics 
regarding Belgian import flows afterwards the GBP devaluation. I assume, for simplicity, that the 
import prices for a given product in the period before the GBP devaluation is equal to the spot 
exchange rate (1 GBP = 1.40 euros). Then, for a hypothetical traded quantity of 1,000, Belgian 
firms import 1,400 euros from the UK. After a hypothetical GBP devaluation to 1.20 euros, for 
instance, prices of imported products will adjust to this new scenario, in which a complete ERPT 
means importing prices of 1.20 euros and an incomplete ERPT leads to prices at some level 
between 1.20 and 1.40 euros. 
Under the assumption of local currency pricing in euros, the price of tradable goods imported 
from the UK to the EU could have presented some rigidity after the GBP devaluation. Besides this, 
the GBP devaluation means an opportunity to British exporters to increase their markup, not 
passing all the exchange rate through export prices after a currency devaluation (Berman et al., 
2012). Then, we can expect that the GBP devaluation leads to a low ERPT to imported prices 
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denominated in euros. As a result, after the GBP devaluation, import prices in euros necessarily 
drop but not as much as the exchange rate variation, which results in higher prices in GBP.  
Concerning imported quantities, it is reasonable to expect a higher demand for cheaper British 
products in euros, from Belgium’s perspective. However, the final effect on import flows in euros 
is indeterminate. Although we can expect that Belgian firms import more volumes from the UK 
because of more competitive prices, this variation in quantities can be sufficient, higher or not 
enough to compensate for the lower prices of products in euros, leading to constant, larger and 
lower import flows in euros, respectively. 
4.1.2 Export flows  
When it comes to export flows, assuming the price of exported Belgian goods invoiced in 
euros, the GBP devaluation turns Belgian goods more expensive to UK costumers. Consequently, 
Belgian exporting firms may adjust their markups to this currency appreciation. The magnitude of 
these effects, however, depends on several firm characteristics, as already widely addressed in the 
literature on exchange rate shocks.   
For instance, Amiti et al. (2014) use Belgian data to show that high import intensive exporting 
firms and firms with higher market shares have lower ERPT. Li et al. (2015) analyze Chinese 
exporters and find moderate but significant volume changes with almost complete ERPT, which 
differs slightly according to firms’ productivity, import intensity, distribution costs, income level 
of importers and foreign ownership. Winters and Fernandes (2018) find a combination of lower 
markups, pricing-to-market (PTM) and lower sales from Portugal to the UK in the aftermath of 
the Brexit referendum outcome announcement and consequent GBP devaluation, whose effect is 
higher for larger firms and for consumer goods. 
Table 1B shows the expected effects of the incomplete ERPT to export prices on export flows 
after the GBP devaluation. First, Belgian firms reduce export prices of goods, in euros, traded with 
the UK, since prices are higher in sterling pounds. As a result, the quantities exported from 
Belgium to the UK are expected to decrease, given the higher costs for British costumers. Lastly, 
the combined effects of lower ERPT, to contain the rise of prices in GBP to the UK market, with 
the negative quantity prospects, leads to lower Belgian export flows to the UK. 
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4.2 Uncertainties 
Now, I turn to the hypotheses concerning the impact of uncertainties on the trade flows 
between Belgium and the UK in the time surrounding the Brexit referendum. These propositions 
take into account Belgian and British trading firms’ decisions and households’ reaction to the 
political uncertainties, which could have reduced the positive and triggered the negative price 
effects of the GBP devaluation on the Belgian firms’ import and export flows. In this regard, to 
give support to the buildup of hypotheses on the effects of uncertainties on firms’ decisions, and 
as I do not have similar information for Belgium firms, I rely on the Agents’ Summary of Business 
conditions, produced by the Bank of England9, a quarterly report comprising 12 regional agents 
with views and expectations of more than 700 senior business executives across the UK.  
Specifically, I use two measures obtained from these reports: the agents’ score for investment 
decisions, which takes into account possible firms’ expenditure over 12 months in tangible non-
financial assets, and the agents’ score for employment intention, which refers to changes in firms’ 
workforce within 6 months. Figures 5A and 5B show the progress of the agents’ scores for 
investment decisions and employment intention in the UK from 2015:Q1 to 2017:Q4. In both 
scores, firms’ investment and employment forecasts decline at the time preceding the Brexit 
referendum, as a potential consequence of the uncertainties involving this voting process and its 
outcome. Although both indices recover quickly in the aftermath of the announcement of the 
referendum results, they come back to lower levels than experienced before the presence of 
political uncertainties concerning the Brexit, such as the first semester of 2015.  
These British agents’ scores for investment decisions and employment intention give an 
indication of the impact of Brexit uncertainties on British firms’ short run decisions. For the sake 
of the construction of hypotheses, I suppose that Belgian firms with trade relationship with the UK 
respond similarly in terms of investment and employment decisions, whose level of impact 
depends on firms’ exposure to the UK market and, consequently, to the Brexit uncertainties. 
Moreover, both British and Belgian trading firms are affected also by the exchange rate volatility, 
which could also be a reason to firms postpone exports or imports transactions, or divert part of 
them to other markets. 
 
 
9 Available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk. 
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4.2.1 Import flows  
The impact of the GBP devaluation on Belgian import flows from the UK is unclear, since the 
potentially higher imported quantities can be been sufficient, higher or not enough to compensate 
the price effects, as discussed in section 4.1.1. The players involved in Belgian import flows from 
the UK are British exporting firms and Belgian importing firms and households. Since I do not 
expect any short run impact of the Brexit referendum on Belgian households’ consumption, my 
inference focus on firms’ trade decisions. Then, I hypothesize that both British exporting and 
Belgian importing firms could have reacted to uncertainties triggered by the Brexit referendum, 
reducing traded volumes. Belgian importing firms, for instance, could have additionally activated 
other suppliers to prevent from future shortage or from higher costs of British production inputs.  
This conjecture leads to the first testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Taking into account the effects of the GBP devaluation, the average growth rate of 
Belgian firms’ import flows from the UK is lower than from other Belgium’s main trading partners 
due to uncertainties brought along with the Brexit referendum. 
4.2.2 Export flows  
Concerning exports, the expectations are clear towards lower export flows from Belgium to 
the UK as a consequence of the GBP devaluation, as addressed in section 4.1.2. Now, the players 
are Belgian exporting firms, British importing firms and British households. While Belgian 
exporting firms’ could have reduced investments in marketing and also diverted exports to other 
partners, the instable environment of political uncertainty may also have motivated a more cautious 
behavior in British importing firms and British households’ consumption. Then, I expect that 
uncertainties related to the Brexit referendum result in even lower quantities exported from 
Belgium to the UK, triggering the effects of the GBP devaluation.   
Therefore, we come to the following second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Taking into account the effects of the GBP devaluation, the average growth rate of 
Belgian firms’ export flows to the UK is lower than to other Belgium’s main trading partners due 
to uncertainties brought along with the Brexit referendum. 
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5. Data 
5.1 Data sources  
This paper uses two datasets administrated and provided by the National Bank of Belgium 
(NBB). To evaluate the evolution of Belgian firms’ import and export flows from/to the UK market 
and other neighboring countries, I obtain information from the International Trade in Goods 
Database. This data is available monthly, from which I select a dataset from January 2012, four 
and a half years before the referendum, to one year later, until June 2017.  
I limit the sample to firms with trade relationship with the UK, focus of this analysis, and with 
Belgium’s other main neighboring countries: Germany, France, and the Netherlands. These 
countries are the most important Belgium trading partners and are relatively similar to the UK in 
importance to Belgium’s international trade10. I do not consider Belgium imports and exports to 
Luxembourg in this study, which are significant, but less representative than the trade with other 
neighboring countries. 
I merge this dataset with balance sheet information that is obtained from the Belgian Business 
Registry. Firms’ balance sheet data is provided on an annual basis. I use this information mainly 
to divide the sample by relevant firms’ characteristics in order to account for the heterogeneity of 
the impact of the Brexit referendum outcome on Belgian exporting firms.  
Additionally, I obtain macroeconomic variables concerning Belgium and its main trading 
partners from the statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat). This information is used to 
test the adherence of Belgian firms’ trade flows to economic fundamentals. 
5.2 Construction of variables 
To measure the impact of the Brexit referendum on the trade relationship between Belgium 
and its main trading partners, I rely on the intensive margins of Belgian firms’ import and export 
flows. To accurately calculate these variables, I take into account some specific characteristics of 
the trade data. First, firms may concentrate their trade on particular periods of the year, leading to 
a non-negligible degree of seasonality. Second, many firms may have bulky but infrequent 
 
10 In 2016, according to the Belgian Foreign Trade Agency, these countries figured within the top 5 Belgium suppliers, 
representing 67.7% of the countries’ imports from the EU, and 39.9% worldwide. These countries were also the main 
destination of Belgian exports, accounting for 68.4% of intra EU exports and 41.1% of the total exports. 
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volumes of imports and exports, which need to be distinguished from an eventual lumpiness in 
their trade activity.  
Although I have monthly trade data available, I aggregate the data into more comprehensive 
periods, given its granularity. Ideally, I would rather work with annual data, which would 
completely capture the seasonality issue. However, because of the short period of the analysis, and 
as I am interested in observing the immediate impact of the Brexit referendum outcome and the 
tendency of Belgian imports and exports from/to neighboring countries before that event, my 
analysis requires a shorter level of aggregation. I choose to work on a semiannual basis11, as long 
as using quarterly data would still be too granular, potentially leading to misleading classifications.  
To avoid seasonality, instead of calculating the intensive margin by taking into account two 
consecutive semesters, I measure this variable by computing the annual growth, comparing one 
semester of a given year with the same semester one year before, as given by the following 
equation:  
int_mgi,j,t = ln(tradei,j,t) − ln(tradei,j,t−2),                                             (1) 
where time index t reflects semiannual periods, int_mgi,j,t is the intensive margin of trade (imports 
or exports) of firm i to destination j in time t, tradei,j,t is the amount imported or exported by firm 
i from/to destination j in time t, and tradei,j,t−2 is the amount imported or exported by firm i from/to 
destination j in time t-2.  
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
I provide the summary statistics for the intensive margins of import and export flows for the 
whole sample of Belgian firms in Table 2A. The 28 members of the European Union (“EU28”) 
account for 41.4% and for 50.9% of the total number of Belgian firms (“All”) that have imported 
and exported goods from/to a given country in two semesters, respectively. Within the EU28, 
Belgium’s neighboring countries are the majority of Belgian firms with import (97.2%) and export 
(96.9%) intensive margin information.  
 
11 I aggregate the dataset on a semiannual basis because of its granularity, avoiding a misclassification of trade flows 
produced by incumbent firms (intensive margin) and by entering or exiting firms (extensive margin). The choice for 
the ideal level of aggregation takes into account not disregarding information and, at the same time, having enough 
time variation to observe the impact of the referendum on firms’ short run decisions. Then, using monthly or quarterly 
information could lead to disproportional number of entering/exiting firms, while reducing the number of available 
data for the intensive margin. On the other extreme, using annual information would not allow me to observe the 
immediate effects of the GBP devaluation and potential uncertainties at the time surrounding the Brexit referendum.  
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In Table 2B, I present the summary statistics for the sample of Belgian firms that have 
intensive margin information for at least two of Belgium’s neighboring countries and that have 
available information for the sector they belong to12. Importantly, this sample selection excludes 
approximately only 8.8% and 7.2% of Belgian firms’ intensive margins of import and export flows’ 
observations. It is interesting to observe that the average of intensive margins is considerably 
higher for the subsample of firms with continuous trade relationship with more than one of 
Belgium’s neighboring countries. It implies that the group of firms with a single trade partner 
experienced more intense shortfalls in their average intensive margins and firms with more than 
one continuous trade partner seem more able to access different markets and possibly reorient 
imports and exports. 
5.4 Data preview 
In this section, I compare the average of imports’ and exports’ intensive margins from/to 
Belgium main neighboring countries in Figures 6A and 6B. Belgian firms reported average 
negative intensive margins of import flows to the four considered countries over almost all the 
sample period. However, we cannot visually identify any particular difference in this measure 
across Belgium suppliers. Concerning Belgian firms’ intensive margins of exports, there is a 
consistent upward trend of Belgian firms’ export flows’ growth rates to the UK until 2015S1, and 
then an inflection of this tendency as from 2015S2. The export flows’ growth rates to Belgium’s 
other neighboring countries were considerably lower, or even negative, during the period of 
extensive growth of exports to the UK. Nevertheless, these export markets were not hit by the 
same magnitude as the exports to the UK as from 2015S2. 
Overall, the data suggest that Belgian firms’ export flows are more synchronized with 
economic circumstances, as long as the periods of growth in exports to the UK coincide with a 
better British economic performance and a more appreciated sterling pound. On the other hand,   
Belgian firms’ import flows seem less responsive to macroeconomic variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Since I cluster the errors by sectors, I lose observations in which this information is not available. Then, the 
descriptive statistics replicate the samples used in the empirical tests. 
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6. Methodology and empirical results 
6.1 Impact of the Brexit referendum on Belgian firms’ short-run decisions 
I start this empirical section by analyzing the behavior of Belgian imports and exports from/to 
the UK in comparison to other neighboring countries in the time surrounding the Brexit 
referendum. In this first step, my focus is on observing whether the Brexit referendum has an 
impact on the trade relationship between Belgium and the UK, and, if so, on the timing and the 
intensity. I am therefore not particularly interested in just one single intermediate or post 
coefficient, but rather look at the bi-annual differences. In particular, I look at the relative changes 
in the trade between Belgium and the UK in each of the semesters in the aftermath of the surprising 
referendum outcome, as well as variations in the semester preceding the voting procedure. I am 
also concerned with the Belgian exports’ and imports’ trends to Belgium’s neighboring countries 
before any influence of the uncertainties regarding the Brexit referendum. 
I evaluate the effect of the Brexit uncertainties on trade by calculating the intensive margins 
of Belgian firms’ exports and imports to/from the UK in comparison to Belgium’s other 
neighboring countries and important trade partners (Germany, France, and the Netherlands). I 
select all Belgian firms that have imports’ or exports’ intensive margin information, respectively, 
for at least two Belgium neighboring countries at a given time.  
Initially, I run the following regression model for both Belgian firms’ exports and imports: 
 
Int_mgi,j,t =  ∑ βjneighj
3
j=1 +  ∑ ∑ βj,tneighj ∗
8
t=1 timet
3
j=1 + λi,t + εi,j,t.                                        (2)  
 
where Int_mgi,j,t takes the values of the intensive margins of imports and exports, respectively. 
The remaining variables of the model are described as follows: timet is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for a given semester, and 0 otherwise. neighj is a set of dummy variables that take 
the value 1 for the intensive margins of Belgian firms’ imports and exports, respectively, from/to 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands, and 0 otherwise; λi,t controls for firm-time fixed effects, 
and takes into consideration the unobserved differences in Belgian firms’ total factor productivity 
(TFP) over time; and εi,j,t is the error term. I am interested in all the coefficients of the interaction 
between timet and neighj, especially those in the surrounding of the Brexit referendum
 13. I cluster 
 
13 Statistically significant and positive coefficients should be interpreted as an evidence of higher growth rate of 
imports of exports to a given Belgium’s neighboring country in comparison to the UK in time t relatively to the same 
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the errors by sectors, as long as the error terms for firms within the same sector are very likely to 
be correlated.  
Imports 
I present the outcomes for the intensive margin of imports in Table 3A, whose coefficients for 
the country-time interactions (point estimates) are also illustrated in Figure 7A. We notice a 
statistically significant increment of Belgian firms’ import flows from France in the two semesters 
that followed the surprising results (2016S2 and 2017S1) and from Germany (2017S1). It is also 
interesting to realize that the country-time coefficients follow similar trends up to 2016S1, which 
change in the same direction afterwards.  
These coefficients indicate that a potential increase in the quantities imported from the UK 
following the GBP devaluation did not offset the respective price effects 14 . However, these 
relatively lower growth rates to the UK in comparison to Germany and France may also be 
explained by differences in their respective business cycles, for instance. Additionally, these 
results also suggest that Belgian firms may have decided to import relatively more from permanent 
EU trade partners, who also share the same currency, responding in the short-run to the 
uncertainties related to the future Brexit agreements. 
Exports 
Next, I turn to the investigation of the effect of Brexit uncertainties on the intensive margin of 
Belgian firms’ export flows. The outcomes are presented in Table 3B and the coefficients for the 
country-time interactions (point estimates) are replicated in Figure 7B. The results are in line with 
the expectation of lower export flows’ growth rates from Belgian to British firms comparing to 
firms in Belgium’s other main trading partners. Belgian firms experience relatively higher exports’ 
growth rates to the Netherlands from 2015S2 until 2017S1, to France from 2016S1 until 2017S1, 
and to Germany in 2016S2. 
As before, these results may have been caused solely by the reaction of Belgian exporting 
firms to economic fundamentals but also amplified by the instable environment created by the 
Brexit referendum. Importantly, we realize once more a strong and simultaneous upward 
 
difference in 2013S1. The choice of this period as base is arbitrary but has no practical effect, as the intuition 
underlying this preliminary study is to capture intensive margins’ trends and their respective deviations. 
14 As explained in section 4, even assuming low ERPT, British tradable goods became cheaper to Belgian firms, in 
euros, in comparison to euro denominated counterparts, following the GBP devaluation. 
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movement in country-time coefficients, but now as from 2015S2, which suggests that the impact 
the GBP devaluation and potentially the Brexit uncertainties were affecting Belgian export flows 
already one year prior to the referendum.  
6.2. Difference-in-differences approach 
Now I turn to my main specification, which is motivated by the outcomes of previous model. 
As the country-time coefficients for both imports’ and exports’ intensive margins’ regressions 
follow similar trends before any effect of the Brexit uncertainties, I employ a difference-in-
differences strategy to disentangle the effects of political uncertainty and economic fundamentals. 
The treatment group are the flows to and from the UK, whereas the control group are the flows to 
and from France, Germany and the Netherlands. In addition, I use two time dummies to account 
for sources of exogenous variation: an “intermediate period”, which accounts for the period in 
which the Brexit uncertainties could already be present, but before the results’ announcement; and 
a “post-referendum period”, related to the period in the aftermath of referendum outcome. I then 
compare the intensive margin of Belgian imports and export to the UK and to Belgium’s other 
neighboring countries, using the following regression model: 
Yi,j,t = β1UKj +  β2Intert ∗ UKj + β3Postt ∗ UKj + Xj,t +  λi,t +  εi,j,t.                (3)  
where Yi,j,t takes the values of int_mgi,j,t; Intert is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
2015S2 and 2016S1, and 0 otherwise; Postt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 2016S2 
and 2017S1, and 0 otherwise; and UKj is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the intensive 
margins of imports or exports from/to the UK, Xj,t is a set of changes in macroeconomic variables 
(exchange rates, GDP growth, inflation rates, and interest rates), λi,t are firm-time fixed effects, 
and εi,j,t is the error term. Compared with the coefficients of the preliminary specification, the 
results now give two different perspectives: i. the UK as treatment group, and ii. two new time 
dummies condensing the effects into more comprehensive periods.  
Table 4A shows the outcomes for the intensive margin of import flows. Starting with the 
results without macroeconomic controls, we observe that Belgian firms do not show a relative 
increment of imports’ growth rates from the UK in the semesters preceding the referendum, but 
experience, on average, 4.3 lower percentage points in imports’ growth rates from the UK after 
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the voting process15, compared to other Belgium neighboring countries. These results suggest that 
even if Belgian importing firms increase the imported quantity of goods from the UK, offsetting 
the effects of cheaper prices in euros in import flows, this potential growth is not enough to 
compensate the price effects in the aftermath of the voting process.  
However, after the inclusion of exchange rate changes and especially controlling for 
Belgium’s neighboring countries GDP growth, the coefficient for the interaction of UK with the 
dummy for the period in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum becomes statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. It implies that the economic fundamentals totally capture the lower 
growth of import flows from the UK in comparison to Belgium’s other neighboring countries. 
Therefore, uncertainties related to the Brexit referendum do not seem to have played a role in 
Belgian firms’ import flows. 
Concerning the intensive margin of export flows, the respective outcomes are illustrated in 
Table 4B. First, the regression without macroeconomic controls shows that Belgian firms 
relatively reduce their expansion to the UK market with 7.2 percentage points in the year before 
the referendum, and with 9.3 afterwards, comparing to Belgium’s other main trading partners and 
relative to the pre-period. Belgian exporting firms adjust their prices and exported quantities in the 
wake of the GBP devaluation given their susceptibilities, such as capacity to prevent a high pass-
through of exchange rate changes to export prices, preservation of their markups, and adeptness to 
differentiate prices across markets.  
In columns 2-5, I introduce economic fundamentals to disentangle the effects of (political) 
uncertainty from economic fundamentals. These controls, which account for Belgian firms’ 
responsiveness to the GBP devaluation and Belgium’s neighboring countries economic 
performance, influence the magnitude of the previous coefficients but preserve their relevance and 
statistical significance. Consequently, macroeconomic variables do have an effect on export flows, 
but do not capture all the variation in their intensive margin to the UK in relation to the treatment 
group.   
Then, I find that, after controlling for macroeconomic variables, export flows’ growth rates to 
the UK 5.8 and 4.4 percentage points lower one year before and one year after the Brexit 
referendum, respectively, in comparison to Belgium’s other neighboring countries16. I associate 
 
15 Statistically significant only at the 10% level. 
16 Comparing the relative economic relevance these findings, I estimate from the coefficients of Table 4B that 80.6% 
and 47.3% of the variation in the intensive margin of exports in the periods before and after the referendum, 
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these remaining results to the instable environment created by the Brexit referendum17, which 
boosts the negative price effects of the GBP devaluation on Belgian export flows’ growth rates. 
Belgian exporting firms possibly reduce their volumes exported to the UK and/or divert part of 
their production to other trading partners, a pattern that supports the hypothesis that the 
uncertainties brought along with the Brexit referendum influence Belgian trading firms’ decisions 
in the short-run.  
Overall, these findings suggest that import and export markets have different dynamics and 
react differently to changes in economic variables and political uncertainties. This distinction 
might be explained by the characteristics of each segment, such as stickiness of imported prices 
and quantities, and a fast adjustment of exporting prices (Bonadio et al., 2018). In accordance, my 
results imply more rigidity of import flows, and more sensitivity of export flows to economic and 
political turmoil.  
6.3. Belgian firms’ heterogeneity 
In this section, I provide additional discussion of the impact of the Brexit referendum on the 
bilateral trade between Belgium and its main trading partners. I examine the heterogeneity of these 
effects in terms of Belgian firms’ sizes and sectors. The relative decline in the export and import 
flows’ growth rate to the UK could have been experienced in a different way by Belgian firms 
depending on their susceptibility to exchange rate movements, disparities in business cycles, 
political uncertainties and on their capacity to absorb the costs of diverting production or switching 
suppliers to different markets. To investigate it, I rerun the specification (3) without and with 
macroeconomic controls but now splitting the sample into the two different approaches mentioned 
above. I also test the statistic difference between the coefficients of the respective subsamples. 
6.3.1. Firm size 
I start by differentiating firms by their sizes, taking into consideration the average of total 
assets over the three years before the Brexit referendum for each firm and then dividing the sample 
by the respective median. 
 
respectively, may be related to Brexit uncertainties. These results are sizable and illustrate the extent to which firms 
are exposed to this unforeseen event of renouncing a trade agreement.  
17 Including the GBP/euro exchange rate volatility.  
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Export flows 
I expect that larger exporting firms have a higher capacity to absorb exchange rate movements 
on their markups and present lower ERPT (Winters and Fernandes, 2018), to hedge their currency 
exposures in financial markets, and to stablish different prices for different export markets in the 
wake of exchange rate shocks18  (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2011; Fitzgerald and Haller, 2014). 
Moreover, concerning the effects of Brexit uncertainties, larger firms may also be able to postpone 
export to more stable and predictable periods and to promptly divert part of the production to 
different export markets. 
Table 5A illustrates the results to firms’ sizes. Starting with the regressions without 
macroeconomic controls, we observe that larger firms present relatively lower intensive margin of 
export flows to the UK. This outcome is especially relevant during the “intermediate period”, in 
which I find that larger firms experience 5.9 percentage points19 lower export flows’ growth rates 
to the UK than smaller firms. This result is in line with findings of lower ERPT for larger exporters 
(Amiti et al., 2014; Winters and Fernandes, 2018). 
Then, I introduce macroeconomic variables to account for price and quantity effects caused 
by economic fundamentals. Interestingly, we observe a higher impact of exchange rate variations 
on smaller firms, as long as larger firms are better able to shield themselves from currency shocks. 
With these controls, I find that larger firms experience 7.7 and 5.9 lower percentage points20  in 
the intensive margins of export flows to the UK, on average, in comparison to other Belgium’s 
main trading partners in the intermediate and post-period, respectively, while smaller firms 
presented 3.1 lower percentage points21 before the Brexit referendum but statistically insignificant 
coefficient afterwards. The difference between larger and smaller firms’ coefficients is statistically 
significant only in the intermediate period, when larger firms’ coefficient is 4.6 percentage points 
lower than the coefficient for smaller firms. 
The outcomes of this subsample analysis suggest that larger firms take additional actions in 
response to the uncertainties related to Brexit referendum in the time preceding the Brexit 
referendum. A possible explanation for this finding is that larger firms have more capacity to 
 
18 Pricing-to-market (PTM). 
19 Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
20 Significant at the 1% and 5% levels of significance, respectively. 
21 Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
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postpone exports to the UK and reorient their exports to other markets and absorb the associated 
costs.  
Import flows 
I repeat the same exercise for import flows, whose results are reported in Table 5B. Without 
macroeconomic controls, I do not find any substantial difference between large and small firms’ 
subsamples. Interestingly, after controlling for economic variables, I find that Belgian smaller 
firms present higher import flows’ growth rates to the UK in comparison to other Belgium’s main 
trading partners in the post-period. In addition, this coefficient is statistically different from the 
coefficient for larger firms. Although these results imply some degree of intertemporal choices22, 
they do not give evidence that the political uncertainties caused by the Brexit referendum could be 
influencing larger Belgian importing firms’ decisions. 
6.3.2. Sector 
I now take into account the two main Belgian exporting sectors, which concentrate the 
majority of exports and have intrinsic different characteristics: manufactured goods and 
“commodities” (agricultural products, raw materials, energy products or services). Since 
commodities are considered more homogeneous goods and manufactured goods are deemed more 
responsive to changes in countries’ competitiveness (Schmitz et. al., 2012), I test whether both 
segments could have reacted differently to the Brexit referendum.  
Export flows 
Table 6A presents the results for the export flows across different sectors. Concerning the 
regressions without macroeconomic controls, I find a slightly higher decrease in the intensive 
margin of export flows to the UK for manufactured goods in both analyzed periods, comparing to 
Belgium’s other trading partners. This result is in accordance with an expected larger effect of the 
GBP devaluation on manufactured or consumer goods (Campa and Goldberg, 2010), in spite of 
the difference between the respective coefficients is not statistically significant.  
After including controls to account for economic fundamentals, the results for the intensive 
margin of export flows to the UK for commodities become barely significant in the intermediate 
 
22 For instance, smaller importing firms could have decided to postpone imports to the period in the aftermath of the 
Brexit referendum.  
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period, and not significant anymore in the year after the Brexit referendum. Conversely, I find 
statistically significant results for the sample of manufacturing goods before and after the Brexit 
referendum 23 , indicating consistently lower growth rates to the UK after controlling for 
macroeconomic changes. It suggests that manufacturing firms may be more reactive to changes in 
competitiveness caused by political distress, as long as these coefficients imply lower exported 
volumes to the UK, or a potential diversion of production to other markets in the wake of the 
uncertainties triggered by the Brexit referendum. However, the differences between manufacturing 
and commodity coefficients in both periods are not statistically significant. 
Import flows 
The outcomes for import flows among firms in the manufacturing and commodities’ sectors 
are reported in Table 6B. Without macroeconomic controls, it is striking to observe that 
manufacturing firms experienced 7.5 percentage points lower growth rates in imports from the UK 
in comparison to Belgium’s other neighboring countries in the wake of the Brexit referendum. 
However, after adding economic fundamentals, while this last effect vanishes, we find that firms 
in the manufacturing sector relatively increase import flows from the UK in 6.5 percentage points 
in the period before the voting process.  
Although apparently atypical, these results might be explained by the higher responsiveness 
of manufacturing goods to changes in competitiveness. Once more, the outcomes for import flows 
imply some degree of intertemporal choices, as manufacturing firms may have decreased imported 
quantities from the UK before the referendum and increased afterwards. However, there is no 
evidence in this regard. On the other hand, firms in the commodities’ sector do not experience any 
significant variation, which is in accordance with the expectation.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the effects the Brexit uncertainties on the bilateral trade between an 
important EU economy – Belgium – and its main trading partners (United Kingdom, Germany, 
France and the Netherlands). I find that import and export markets have different dynamics and 
react differently to changes in economic variables and political uncertainties. While import flows 
are more rigid and do not react to the uncertainties related to the Brexit referendum, the instable 
 
23 -5.9, at the 1% level, and -5.8 percentage points, at the 5% level of significance, respectively. 
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environment created by the Brexit referendum boosts the negative price effects of the GBP 
devaluation on Belgian export flows’ growth rates.  
Consequently, Belgian exporting firms possibly postpone their volumes exported to the UK 
to more stable periods or divert part of their production to other trading partners. This inference 
supports the hypothesis that the uncertainties brought along with the Brexit referendum influence 
Belgian and British trading firms’ decisions in the short-run.  
Following, I examine the heterogeneity of these effects by Belgian exporting firms’ size and 
sector. Concerning export flows, my results suggest that larger firms, more able to absorb the 
associated costs, postpone exported volumes to the UK or are more prone to divert exports to other 
markets. Regarding manufacturing firms, more responsive to changes in competitiveness, results 
suggest more intense reaction to uncertainties than commodities’ producers but are not conclusive. 
In regard to import flows, outcomes give no evidence that the political uncertainties caused by the 
Brexit referendum could be influencing Belgian importing firms’ decisions. 
These findings may be useful to other economies with significant financial and trade 
relationship with the UK, especially those which are part of the EU. In addition, understanding the 
collateral effects of the decision-making to renounce a free trade agreement and how the 
underlying uncertainties affect exchange rate markets and firms’ short-run decisions is also 
important to policymakers worldwide. 
I suggest two possible avenues for future research. First, one could extend the findings in these 
paper to other relevant EU economies. Second, and in addition to the first suggestion, forthcoming 
papers could use firm-product level data to explore the elasticity of substitution between EU-
produced and non-EU-produced traded products in the wake of Brexit uncertainties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24
 
 
References 
 
Amiti, M., Itskhoki, O., & Konings, J. (2014). Importers, exporters, and exchange rate 
disconnect. American Economic Review, 104(7), 1942-78. 
Amiti, M., Itskhoki, O., & Konings, J. (2018). Dominant currencies How firms choose currency 
invoicing and why it matters. Working paper series 353, National Bank of Beligum. 
Arize, A. C., Osang, T., & Slottje, D. J. (2000). Exchange-rate volatility and foreign trade: 
evidence from thirteen LDC's. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 18(1), 10-17. 
Arkolakis, C. (2010). Market penetration costs and the new consumers’ margin in international 
trade. Journal of political economy, 118(6), 1151-1199.  
Baker, S. R., Bloom, N., & Davis, S. J. (2016). Measuring economic policy uncertainty. The 
quarterly journal of economics, 131(4), 1593-1636. 
Baum, C. F., Caglayan, M., Ozkan, N., & Talavera, O. (2006). The impact of macroeconomic 
uncertainty on non-financial firms' demand for liquidity. Review of Financial 
Economics, 15(4), 289-304. 
Baum, C. F., & Caglayan, M. (2010). On the sensitivity of the volume and volatility of bilateral 
trade flows to exchange rate uncertainty. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 29(1), 79-93. 
Berman, N., Martin, P., & Mayer, T. (2012). How do different exporters react to exchange rate 
changes?. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 437-492. 
Bernanke, B. S. (1983). Irreversibility, uncertainty, and cyclical investment. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 98(1), 85-106. 
Bloom, N., Bond, S., & Van Reenen, J. (2007). Uncertainty and investment dynamics. The review 
of economic studies, 74(2), 391-415. 
Bloom, N. (2009). The impact of uncertainty shocks. econometrica, 77(3), 623-685. 
Bonadio, B., Fischer, A. M., & Sauré, P. U. (2018). The speed of exchange rate pass-through. 
Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming. 
Broadbent, B., & Policy, D. G. M. (2017). Brexit and the pound. Bank of England, Speech 23. 
Campa, J and L Goldberg (2010), “The sensitivity of CPI to exchange rates: distribution margins, 
imported inputs, and trade exposure,” Review of Economics and Statistics 92(2): 392-407. 
Campello, M., Cortes, G., d'Almeida, F., & Kankanhalli, G. (2018). Exporting Uncertainty: The 
Impact of Brexit on Corporate America. Available at SSRN 3078220. 
Clark, P. B. (1973). Uncertainty, exchange risk, and the level of international trade. Economic 
Inquiry, 11(3), 302-313. 
Chinn, M. D., & Meese, R. A. (1995). Banking on currency forecasts: how predictable is change 
in money?. Journal of International Economics, 38(1-2), 161-178. 
Das, S., Roberts, M. J., & Tybout, J. R. (2007). Market entry costs, producer heterogeneity, and 
export dynamics. Econometrica, 75(3), 837-873. 
25
 
 
Dixit, A. (1989). Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty. Journal of political Economy, 97(3), 
620-638. 
Engel, C., & West, K. D. (2005). Exchange rates and fundamentals. Journal of political 
Economy, 113(3), 485-517.  
Fernandes, A and L A Winters (2018), “The effect of exchange rate shocks on firm-level exports: 
evidence from the Brexit vote”, CEPR Discussion Paper 13253. 
Fitzgerald, D., & Haller, S. (2014). Exporters and shocks: Dissecting the international elasticity 
puzzle (No. w19968). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gagnon, J. E. (1993). Exchange rate variability and the level of international trade. Journal of 
International economics, 34(3-4), 269-287. 
Gopinath, G., Itskhoki, O., & Rigobon, R. (2010). Currency choice and exchange rate pass-
through. American Economic Review, 100(1), 304-36. 
Gopinath, G., & Itskhoki, O. (2011). In search of real rigidities. NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual, 25(1), 261-310. 
Gopinath, G., & Rigobon, R. (2008). Sticky borders. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2), 
531-575. 
Gulen, H., & Ion, M. (2015). Policy uncertainty and corporate investment. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 29(3), 523-564. 
Handley, K., & Limão, N. (2017). Policy uncertainty, trade, and welfare: Theory and evidence for 
china and the United States. American Economic Review, 107(9), 2731-83. 
Hooper, P., & Kohlhagen, S. W. (1978). The effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the prices and 
volume of international trade. Journal of international Economics, 8(4), 483-511. 
IMF. (2016). United Kingdom: Selected Issues. IMF Country Report No. 16/169. 
Julio, B., & Yook, Y. (2012). Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles. The Journal 
of Finance, 67(1), 45-83. 
Kilian, L., & Taylor, M. P. (2003). Why is it so difficult to beat the random walk forecast of 
exchange rates?. Journal of International Economics, 60(1), 85-107. 
Leduc, S., & Liu, Z. (2016). Uncertainty shocks are aggregate demand shocks. Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 82, 20-35. 
Li, H., Ma, H., & Xu, Y. (2015). How do exchange rate movements affect Chinese exports?—A 
firm-level investigation. Journal of International Economics, 97(1), 148-161. 
MacDonald, R., & Taylor, M. P. (1994). The monetary model of the exchange rate: long-run 
relationships, short-run dynamics and how to beat a random walk. Journal of international 
money and finance, 13(3), 276-290. 
Mark, N. C., & Sul, D. (2001). Nominal exchange rates and monetary fundamentals: evidence 
from a small post-Bretton Woods panel. Journal of international economics, 53(1), 29-52. 
Meese, R. A., & Rogoff, K. (1983a). Empirical exchange rate models of the seventies: Do they fit 
out of sample?. Journal of international economics, 14(1-2), 3-24. 
26
 
 
Meese, R., & Rogoff, K. (1983b). The out-of-sample failure of empirical exchange rate models: 
sampling error or misspecification?. In Exchange rates and international 
macroeconomics (pp. 67-112). University of Chicago Press. 
Neiman, B. (2010). Stickiness, synchronization, and pass-through in intrafirm trade prices. Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 57(3), 295-308. 
Pierce, J. R., & Schott, P. K. (2016). The surprisingly swift decline of US manufacturing 
employment. American Economic Review, 106(7), 1632-62. 
Schmitz, M., De Clercq, M., Fidora, M., Lauro, B., & Pinheiro, C. (2013). Revisiting the effective 
exchange rates of the euro. Journal of Economic and Social Measurement, 38(2), 127-158. 
Sauer, C., & Bohara, A. K. (2001). Exchange rate volatility and exports: regional differences between 
developing and industrialized countries. Review of International Economics, 9(1), 133-152. 
Steinberg, J. B. (2019). Brexit and the macroeconomic impact of trade policy uncertainty. Journal 
of International Economics, 117, 175-195. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27
 
 
Figure 1 – GBP/Euro exchange rates (2013-2017) 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the daily GBP/Euro exchange rates from 2013 to June 2017. 
 
           Source: Eurostat 
Figure 2 – GDP growth of UK and Belgium’ main neighboring countries (2015/4 = 1) 
Notes: Figure 2 compares the economic growth between the UK and Belgium’s main 
neighboring countries (Germany, France, and the Netherlands). All indices are equal to 
1 in 2015/4 (4th trimester of 2015) to facilitate the comparison. We show that the UK 
economy grew at a rate considerably higher than its neighboring countries’ economies 
until the end of 2015, but did not underperform significantly to its EU peers as from 
2016. 
 
           Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 3A – Euro Area and UK inflation rates (2013-2017) 
Notes: Figure 3A shows the inflation rates of the Euro Area and the UK from 2013 
to June 2017. 
 
             Source: Eurostat 
Figure 3B – Euro Area and UK interest rates (2013-2017) 
Notes: Figure 3B shows the interest rates of the Euro Area and the UK from 2013 
to June 2017. 
 
               Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 4 – Euro/GBP (exchange rate and volatility index) and political uncertainty 
Notes: Figure 4 shows the evolution of the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index (Baker et al., 2016) 
in combination with the euro/GBP spot rate and its respective volatility index (secondary axis). The 
methodology for the EPU takes into consideration the number of new articles that include the terms 
“uncertainty” and other policy terms (“economy”, “policy”, “regulation”, etc) in 11 UK relevant 
newspapers. Exchange rate volatility (BPVIX) is retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Datastream 
database. 
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Figure 5A – Agents’ Summary of Business Conditions (Bank of England) - Agents’ score for 
investment decisions 
Notes: Figure 5A shows the progress of the agents’ score for investment decision from 2015:Q1 to 2017:Q4, published 
on Agents’ Summary of Business Conditions, a quarterly reported produced by the Bank of England. The score for 
investment decisions takes into consideration possible firms’ expenditure in tangible non-financial assets over a 
horizon of 12 months. 
 
Figure 5B – Agents’ Summary of Business conditions (Bank of England) - Agents’ score for 
Employment intention 
Notes: Figure 5B shows the progress of the agents’ score for investment decision from 2015:Q1 to 2017:Q4, published 
on Agents’ Summary of Business Conditions, a quarterly reported produced by the Bank of England. The score for 
employment intention takes into consideration possible changes in firms’ workforce within 6 months. 
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Figure 6A – Average intensive margin of imports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries 
Notes: Figure 6A shows the average Belgium firms’ imports’ growth rate to its main neighboring countries from 
2013 to the first semester of 2017. 
 
Figure 6B – Average intensive margin of exports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries 
Notes: Figure 6B shows the average Belgium firms’ exports’ growth rate to its main neighboring countries from 
2013 to the first semester of 2017. 
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Figure 7A – Intensive margin of imports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries – Point 
estimates 
Notes: Figure 7A provides the point estimates (coefficients of the interaction terms ∑ ∑ 𝛽j,tneigh𝑗 ∗
8
𝑡=1 time𝑡
3
𝑗=1 ) of 
specification (1) when 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 takes the values of 𝑖𝑛𝑡_𝑚𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (imports’ growth rates of Belgian firm i from supplier j at 
time t). The base group are the Belgian firms’ imports’ growth rates from the UK in 2013S1 (1st semester of 2013).   
 
 
Figure 7B – Intensive margin of exports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries - Point 
estimates 
Notes: Figure 7B provides the point estimates (coefficients of the interaction terms ∑ ∑ 𝛽j,tneigh𝑗 ∗
8
𝑡=1 time𝑡
3
𝑗=1 ) of 
specification (1) when 𝑌𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 takes the values of 𝑖𝑛𝑡_𝑚𝑔𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (exports’ growth rates of Belgian firm i to destination j at 
time t). The base group are the Belgian firms’ exports’ growth rates to the UK in 2013S1 (1st semester of 2013).   
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Table 1A – Possible dynamics of Belgian import flows from the UK as a consequence of 
Brexit uncertainties 
Notes: Table 1A demonstrates a simple example of the possible dynamics regarding Belgian import flows afterwards 
the GBP devaluation. I assume, for simplicity, that the traded price for a given product in the period before any impact 
of uncertainties associated with the Brexit referendum is equal to the exchange rate (1 GBP = 1.40 euros). After the 
impact of Brexit uncertainties, I hypothesize that the exchange rate GBP/euro moves to 1.20. The columns “Price”, 
“Quantity”, and “Imp. /Exp. flows” report the expected effects on the prices in euros and sterling pounds (GBP), the 
quantities traded and the trade flows in both currencies. 
Trade partners / 
Scenarios 
Belgian firms importing from British firms 
Exchange rate          
e = (GBP/euro) 
Price 
(𝑃𝐸 and 𝑃𝐺𝐵𝑃) 
Quantity 
(q) 
Imp./Exp. flows  
(𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐸  and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐺𝐵𝑃) 
Before Brexit 
uncertainties 
e = 1.40 
𝑃𝐸 = 1.40; 
𝑃𝐺𝐵𝑃 = 1.00 
q = 1,000 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐸 = 1,400; 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐺𝐵𝑃 = 1,000 
After Brexit 
uncertainties 
e = 1.20 
1.20 < 𝑃𝐸 < 1.40; 
𝑃𝐺𝐵𝑃 > 1.00 
q > 1,000 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐸  >, <, = 1,400; 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐺𝐵𝑃 > 1,000 
    
 
Table 1B – Possible dynamics of Belgian export flows to the UK as a consequence of Brexit 
uncertainties 
Notes: Table 1B demonstrates a simple example of the possible dynamics regarding Belgian export flows afterwards 
the GBP devaluation. I assume, for simplicity, that the traded price for a given product in the period before any impact 
of uncertainties associated with the Brexit referendum is equal to the exchange rate (1 GBP = 1.40 euros). After the 
impact of Brexit uncertainties, I hypothesize that the exchange rate GBP/euro moves to 1.20. The columns “Price”, 
“Quantity”, and “Imp. /Exp. flows” report the expected effects on the prices in euros and sterling pounds (GBP), the 
quantities traded and the trade flows in both currencies. 
Trade partners / 
Scenarios 
Belgian firms exporting to British firms 
Exchange rate          
e = (GBP/euro) 
Price 
(𝑃𝐸 and 𝑃𝐺𝐵𝑃) 
Quantity 
(q) 
Imp./Exp. flows  
(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐸  and 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐺𝐵𝑃) 
Before Brexit 
uncertainties 
e = 1.40 
𝑃𝐸 = 1.40; 
𝑃𝐺𝐵𝑃 = 1.00 
q = 1,000 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐸 = 1,400; 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐺𝐵𝑃 = 1,000 
After Brexit 
uncertainties 
e = 1.20 
1.20 < 𝑃𝐸 < 1.40; 
𝑃𝐺𝐵𝑃 > 1.00 
q < 1,000 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐸 < 1,400; 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐺𝐵𝑃  >, <, = 1,000 
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Table 2A – Summary statistics of the intensive margins of Belgian firms’ import and export 
flows – whole sample 
Notes: in Table 2A, I provide the summary statistics for the intensive margins of import and export flows for the whole 
sample of Belgian firms.  
Suppliers 
Imports 
N Mean Median sd 
All 182195 -0.0827 -0.0070 1.0258 
EU28 75367 -0.0558 -0.0022 0.4093 
Neighbors 73223 -0.0628 -0.0079 0.4676 
United Kingdom 31069 -0.0362 -0.0095 1.0133 
France 53244 -0.0551 -0.0180 0.7848 
Germany 56863 -0.0441 -0.0035 0.7156 
Netherlands 61904 -0.0418 -0.0025 0.7020 
Destinations 
Exports 
N Mean Median sd 
All 106509 -0.0301 0.0058 0.9049 
EU28 54216 -0.0364 0.0082 0.4049 
Neighbors 52539 -0.0418 0.0025 0.8699 
United Kingdom 26385 0.0023 0.0196 0.6344 
France 43679 -0.0246 -0.0036 0.7996 
Germany 36838 -0.0217 0.0037 0.6505 
Netherlands 43714 -0.0233 0.0081 0.4546 
Table 2B – Summary statistics - Belgian firms with continuous trade relationship with at 
least two Belgium’s neighboring countries  
Notes: in Table 2B, I present the summary statistics for the sample of Belgian firms that have intensive margin 
information for at least two Belgium’s neighboring countries, and that have available information of the sector they 
belong to. 
Suppliers 
Imports 
N Mean Median Sd 
United Kingdom 29442 -0.0342 -0.0083 1.0148 
France 48078 -0.0507 -0.0165 0.7916 
Germany 52286 -0.0370 -0.0013 0.7138 
Netherlands 54227 -0.0309 0.0015 0.7026 
Total 184033 -0.0384 -0.0050 0.7866 
Destinations 
Exports 
N Mean Median Sd 
United Kingdom 25647 0.0035 0.0196 0.8695 
France 38815 -0.0163 0.0005 0.6228 
Germany 35204 -0.0173 0.0052 0.7960 
Netherlands 39216 -0.0121 0.0131 0.6424 
Total 138882 -0.0117 0.0085 0.7247 
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Table 3A – Intensive margin of imports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries – Point 
estimates 
Notes: in Table 3A, I analyze the behavior of Belgian imports’ growth rates from the UK (base group) in the time 
surrounding the Brexit referendum outcome, comparing it with the imports’ growth rates from Belgium other main 
neighboring countries. I use firm-time fixed-effects to takes into consideration the unobserved differences in Belgian 
firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) over time. For this first specification, I select all Belgian firms that have imports’ 
intensive margin information for at least two Belgium neighboring countries at a given time. I report results for the 
country-time interactions (point estimates) and for the country dummies. I cluster the errors by firms’ sectors. 
  
 
Countries Germany France Netherlands 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
(t
im
e*
co
u
n
tr
y
) 
2013S2 
0.012 -0.003 0.004 
(0.015) (0.032) (0.012) 
2014S1 
-0.014 -0.008 -0.033** 
(0.012) (0.029) (0.013) 
2014S2 
0.013 -0.000 -0.017 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020) 
2015S1 
-0.001 0.028 -0.002 
(0.014) (0.021) (0.018) 
2015S2 
-0.013 -0.030 -0.009 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.026) 
2016S1 
0.033 -0.012 -0.003 
(0.031) (0.053) (0.018) 
2016S2 
0.052 0.056*** 0.038 
(0.038) (0.019) (0.044) 
2017S1 
0.041*** 0.036*** 0.026 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) 
Country 
dummies 
0.003 -0.011 0.021** 
(0.011) (0.021) (0.009) 
     
Observations     184033 
Adjusted R-squared  0.114 
Fixed Effects   firm-time 
Cluster       Sector 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 3B – Intensive margin of exports to Belgium’s main neighboring countries – Point 
estimates 
Notes: in Table 3B, I analyze the behavior of Belgian exports’ growth rates to the UK (base group) in the time 
surrounding the Brexit referendum outcome, comparing it with the exports’ growth rates to Belgium other main 
neighboring countries. I use firm-time fixed-effects to takes into consideration the unobserved differences in Belgian 
firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) over time. For this first specification, I select all Belgian firms that have imports’ 
intensive margin information for at least two Belgium neighboring countries at a given time. I report results for the 
country-time interactions (point estimates) and for the country dummies. I cluster the errors by firms’ sectors. 
  
 
Countries Germany France Netherlands 
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
(t
im
e*
co
u
n
tr
y
) 
2013S2 
0.000 -0.001 0.040*** 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
2014S1 
-0.049 -0.037 0.049 
(0.047) (0.024) (0.033) 
2014S2 
-0.044 -0.042* 0.025 
(0.041) (0.020) (0.040) 
2015S1 
-0.026 -0.051* 0.023 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.031) 
2015S2 
0.032 0.015 0.093*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.031) 
2016S1 
0.050 0.066*** 0.131*** 
(0.043) (0.018) (0.031) 
2016S2 
0.088*** 0.092*** 0.157*** 
(0.023) (0.016) (0.042) 
2017S1 
0.032 0.038* 0.107*** 
(0.026) (0.019) (0.036) 
Country 
dummies 
-0.020 -0.018 -0.077** 
(0.033) (0.022) (0.035) 
     
Observations     138882 
Adjusted R-squared  0.116 
Fixed Effects   firm-time 
Cluster       Sector 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4A – Intensive margin of imports to Belgium’s main neighboring countries – diff-in-
diff strategy with the UK as the treated group 
Notes: in Table 4A, I report the results of specification (7) for the intensive margin of imports using a difference-in-
differences strategy. The treatment group is the UK and the control group are Belgium’s other neighboring countries. 
The regression model relies on similar trends before any effect of the Brexit uncertainties. I divide the potential impact 
of Brexit uncertainties into two time-dummies: the first one, “intermediate period”, accounts for the period in which 
the Brexit uncertainties were already present, but before the results’ announcement; and the second one, “post-period”, 
related to the period in the aftermath of referendum outcome. Macroeconomic control variables are added one at a 
time. ∆ej,t is the variation of the average of exchange rates between Belgium and its neighboring countries; ∆GDPj,t is 
the variation of the gross domestic product (GDP); ∆ij,t is the percentage points’ difference of money market 12-
months interest rates for the Euro zone countries and the UK; and ∆HICP𝑗,𝑡 is the variation of the harmonized index of 
consumer prices (HICP). All variations are measured considering the variation of period t to period t-2, likewise the 
calculation of intensive margins of trade. I cluster the errors by firms’ sectors. 
  
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
UK -0.003 -0.004 -0.015 -0.013 -0.045*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
Inter*UK 0.004 0.005 0.012 0.019 0.029 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.036) (0.033) 
Post*UK -0.043* -0.034 -0.019 -0.016 -0.005 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) 
Δe  0.058 0.064 0.146 0.071 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.135) (0.156) 
ΔGDP   0.737 0.687* 1.478*** 
   (0.426) (0.382) (0.297) 
Δi    -0.039 0.032 
    (0.050) (0.071) 
ΔHICP     2.308*** 
     (0.724) 
      
Observations 184033 184033 184033 184033 184033 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 
Fixed Effects firm-time firm-time firm-time firm-time firm-time 
Cluster Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4B – Intensive margin of exports to Belgium’s main neighboring countries – diff-in-
diff strategy with the UK as the treated group 
Notes: in Table 4B, I report the results of specification (7) for the intensive margin of exports using a difference-in-
differences strategy. The treatment group is the UK and the control group are Belgium’s other neighboring countries. 
The regression model relies on similar trends before any effect of the Brexit uncertainties. I divide the potential impact 
of Brexit uncertainties into two time-dummies: the first one, “intermediate period”, accounts for the period in which 
the Brexit uncertainties were already present, but before the results’ announcement; and the second one, “post-period”, 
related to the period in the aftermath of referendum outcome. Macroeconomic control variables are added one at a 
time. ∆ej,t is the variation of the average of exchange rates between Belgium and its neighboring countries; ∆GDPj,t is 
the variation of the gross domestic product (GDP); ∆ij,t is the percentage points’ difference of money market 12-
months interest rates for the Euro zone countries and the UK; and ∆HICP𝑗,𝑡 is the variation of the harmonized index of 
consumer prices (HICP). All variations are measured considering the variation of period t to period t-2, likewise the 
calculation of intensive margins of trade. I cluster the errors by firms’ sectors. 
   
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
UK 0.046*** 0.039** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.049*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) 
Inter*UK -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.058*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
Post*UK -0.093*** -0.059** -0.036** -0.035** -0.044** 
 (0.008) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) 
Δe  0.219 0.225* 0.276*** 0.332*** 
  (0.125) (0.123) (0.072) (0.061) 
ΔGDP   1.124* 1.084** 0.517 
   (0.543) (0.498) (0.338) 
Δi    -0.026 -0.085* 
    (0.030) (0.048) 
ΔHICP     -1.881*** 
     (0.617) 
      
Observations 138882 138882 138882 138882 138882 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
Fixed Effects firm-time firm-time firm-time firm-time firm-time 
Cluster Sector Sector Sector Sector Sector 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 5A – Intensive margin of exports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries – Firms’ 
Heterogeneity (firm size) 
Notes: in Table 5A, I report the results for the heterogeneity of the Brexit uncertainties among Belgian exporting firms 
considering their respective sizes. I take into consideration the average of total assets over the three years before the 
Brexit referendum for each firm, and then dividing the sample by the respective median. I also report the coefficients 
for the differences between “larger” and “smaller” firms (2-1). I present the results first without considering any 
macroeconomic variable and them including these controls. I cluster the errors by firms’ sectors. 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (2-1) 
        
Without macroeconomic controls   
    
Inter*UK -0.039*** -0.098*** -0.059*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) 
Post*UK -0.080*** -0.103*** -0.023 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.026) 
    
With macroeconomic controls   
    
Inter*UK -0.031** -0.077*** -0.046** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) 
Post*UK -0.022 -0.059** -0.038 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.023) 
Δe 0.413*** 0.266*** -0.148* 
 (0.080) (0.056) (0.080) 
ΔGDP 0.161 0.840** 0.679* 
 (0.319) (0.360) (0.349) 
Δi -0.093 -0.072* 0.020 
 (0.065) (0.040) (0.041) 
ΔHICP -3.095*** -0.776 2.319*** 
 (0.812) (0.860) (0.564) 
    
Observations 66463 72419 138882 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114 0.114 0.116 
Fixed Effects firm-time firm-time firm-time 
Cluster Sector Sector Sector 
Sample smaller larger Both 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5B – Intensive margin of imports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries – Firms’ 
Heterogeneity (firm size) 
Notes: in Table 5B, I report the results for the heterogeneity of the Brexit uncertainties among Belgian importing firms 
considering their respective sizes. I take into consideration the average of total assets over the three years before the 
Brexit referendum for each firm, and then dividing the sample by the respective median. I also report the coefficients 
for the differences between “larger” and “smaller” firms (2-1). I present the results first without considering any 
macroeconomic variable and them including these controls. I cluster the errors by firms’ sectors. 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (2-1) 
        
Without macroeconomic controls   
    
Inter*UK -0.014 0.015 0.029 
 (0.016) (0.034) (0.039) 
Post*UK -0.037 -0.044 -0.008 
 (0.027) (0.038) (0.062) 
    
With macroeconomic controls   
    
Inter*UK 0.009 0.041 0.032 
 (0.022) (0.052) (0.068) 
Post*UK 0.020** -0.018 -0.037* 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.021) 
Δe 0.130 0.042 -0.088 
 (0.290) (0.355) (0.606) 
ΔGDP 1.605*** 1.355** -0.250 
 (0.304) (0.498) (0.579) 
Δi 0.058 0.012 -0.046 
 (0.061) (0.128) (0.178) 
ΔHICP 2.291*** 2.296* 0.005 
 (0.256) (1.281) (1.241) 
    
Observations 86165 97868 184033 
Adjusted R-squared 0.125 0.105 0.114 
Fixed Effects firm-time firm-time firm-time 
Cluster Sector Sector Sector 
Sample smaller larger Both 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6A – Intensive margin of exports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries – Firms’ 
Heterogeneity (firm sector) 
Notes: in Table 6A, I report the results for the heterogeneity of the Brexit uncertainties among Belgian exporting firms 
considering their respective sectors. I divide the sample into the two main exporting sectors, which concentrate the 
majority of exports and have intrinsic different characteristics: manufactured goods and “commodities” (agricultural 
products, raw materials, energy products or services). I also report the coefficients for the statistical difference between 
the coefficients for both sectors in (2-1). I present the results first without considering any macroeconomic variable 
and them including these controls. 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (2-1) 
        
Without macroeconomic controls   
    
Inter*UK -0.056** -0.080*** -0.024 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.029) 
Post*UK -0.092*** -0.103*** -0.011 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.029) 
    
With macroeconomic controls   
    
Inter*UK -0.045* -0.059*** -0.014 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.034) 
Post*UK -0.023 -0.058** -0.035 
 (0.033) (0.027) (0.043) 
Δe 0.425** 0.318** -0.107 
 (0.189) (0.149) (0.241) 
ΔGDP 0.225 0.939* 0.714 
 (0.625) (0.549) (0.830) 
Δi -0.033 -0.141** -0.108 
 (0.073) (0.059) (0.094) 
ΔHICP -1.273 -2.702*** -1.430 
 (0.862) (0.746) (1.139) 
    
Observations 62043 64361 126404 
Adjusted R-squared 0.122 0.111 0.118 
Fixed Effects firm-time firm-time firm-time 
Cluster No No No 
Sample Commodities Manufacturing All 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6B – Intensive margin of imports to Belgium’ main neighboring countries – Firms’ 
Heterogeneity (firm sector) 
Notes: in Table 6B, I report the results for the heterogeneity of the Brexit uncertainties among Belgian importing firms 
considering their respective sectors. I divide the sample into the two main exporting sectors, which concentrate the 
majority of exports and have intrinsic different characteristics: manufactured goods and “commodities” (agricultural 
products, raw materials, energy products or services). I also report the coefficients for the statistical difference between 
the coefficients for both sectors in (2-1). I present the results first without considering any macroeconomic variable 
and them including these controls. 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (2-1) 
        
Without macroeconomic controls   
    
Inter*UK -0.030 0.025 0.055* 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.033) 
Post*UK -0.025 -0.075*** -0.050 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.033) 
    
With macroeconomic controls   
    
Inter*UK -0.013 0.065** 0.078** 
 (0.025) (0.029) (0.039) 
Post*UK 0.006 -0.024 -0.031 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.047) 
Δe -0.018 0.315 0.333 
 (0.179) (0.213) (0.279) 
ΔGDP 1.287** 1.405** 0.118 
 (0.521) (0.647) (0.834) 
Δi 0.080 -0.094 -0.175* 
 (0.065) (0.079) (0.103) 
ΔHICP 2.722*** 0.845 -1.878* 
 (0.680) (0.860) (1.100) 
    
Observations 100378 65242 165620 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.110 0.111 
Fixed Effects firm-time firm-time firm-time 
Cluster No No No 
Sample Commodities Manufacturing All 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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